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STABILISATION, RECOVERY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT WITH 
GROWTH AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY REDUCTION: An Interim Political
Economic Agenda for Namibia?
By Reginald Herbold Green
Even the longest journey 
Starts with the first step.
- Confucian/Maoist Proverb
To plan is to choose,
Choose to go forward,
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
The bird of time has but a little way to fly.
And lo the bird is on the wing.
- Omar Khayyam
I.
Mindless Pragmatism or Pragmatic Radicalism?
Except for the ’’reduction of absolute poverty” clause the title is straight 
IMF/World Bank at least at the headline level. Even the absolute poverty 
rubric is Bankspeak albeit of the 1970s. That may seem a strange or perverse 
way of looking at the political economic agenda for independent Namibia. 
SWAPO - the certain overwhelming winner in any reasonably fair election - has 
not fought the liberation struggle to preserve or soften the edges of the 
status quo. A ’’kinder, gentler" duel economy with the white rider using his 
whip and spurs less frequently on his black steed (to paraphrase Lord Malvern 
on "partnership”) is not what SWAPO’s Political Economic Programme is about. 
Nor is the basic pre-planning document Namibia: Towards Economic
Reconstruction and Development a guide to marginalism. So, surely, the 
immediate political economic agenda for a SWAPO government must be radical
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demolition and reconstruction? Surely talk of measures to buy in settlers and 
achieve special relationships with the EEC; to keep Anglo American - De Beers 
in play and to put together a donor consortium a la Zimbabwe's Zimcord 
Conference are at best irrelevant and at worst objectively neo-colonialist? 
Or are they?
SWAPO for one evidently thinks they are not. Its late 1988 economic policy 
statement is quite explicit on several points:
a. potentially the Namibian economy is a growth one, rather like Botswana;
b. South Africa has made a shambles of it by apartheid, war and fiscal 
imprudence;
c. SWAPO must, as the government of independent Namibia, sustain and revive 
the economy as well as change it;
d. in that process there is room for settlers and for foreign firms if they 
are willing to accept that an independent Namibia must be ruled by 
Namibians and its economic policy directed to the welfare of all 
Namibians with special reference to those who so far have had nothing or 
next to nothing;
e. while major changes will be inevitable, the articulation and timing as 
they affect the vital economic interests of settlers and companies of 
good-will are negotiable.
Logically, given that strategic stance, detailed policy prescriptions are 
absent. Equally logically so is any assertion that sweeping nationalisation 
or total redistribution of land, let alone the end of a role for the private 
sector, are short term agenda topics.
Has SWAPO lost its convictions or its nerve? There is little reason to assume 
any such explanation. What SWAPO has done is look at Zimbabwe and Botswana in 
contrast to 1975-81 Mozambique and Angola and draw certain conclusions about 
what type of transition to a nationally formulated (even if constrained) 
political economic strategy and a nationally influenced economy is more likely 





changes at a later stage. This is not based on any thesis that Angola and 
Mozambique ever had the Botswana/Zimbabwe option open to them but on the 
belief that it may be available to Namibia and, if so, should be grasped.
If that contention is accepted, three political economic challenges confront 
Namibia:
1. stabilisation - halting the 1977-1987 economic erosion and averting a
sharp transitional fall of output, exports and state revenue at
independence;
2. recovery - restoring a forward dynamic to output and public services per
capita (with a bias in favour of poor Namibians rather than a bias
against moderately well-off ones) and building a fiscal and earned import 
capacity (export) base adequate for sustained political economic
reconstruction;
3- structural adjustment - in production, income distribution, access to
public services (especially human investment and infrastructure),
international trade (both externally and regionally) and ownership 
(including joint ventures and domestic private as well as public sector 
expansion).
Whether this is or is not a radical agenda depends on, a.) what is included in 
structural adjustment and, b.) what the future intentions of those making 
political economic decisions are. Oddly the distinction probably does not 
turn on any instant "dependence reduction" formulation, but on whether or not 
rapid reduction (or diversification) of dependence on RSA is integral to the 
programme and whether certain structural adjustment steps (notably replacing 
Walvis Bay if RSA declines to end its illegal occupation thereof at the same 
time as in the rest of Namibia) are viewed as temporally parallel to - indeed 
key components in - stabilisation. Emphasis on absolute poverty reduction via 
particular emphases in raising production, employment and access to basic 
productive services (e.g. health, education, water, agricultural and other 
extension) is an important issue but not a test of radicalism in the normal 
use of that term (e.g. it is prominent in Mozambican and, in rather different 





Stabilisation means halting negative trends. Its association with contraction 
is premised on the assumption reallocation (e.g. from ’homelands1 and ’police’ 
functions) and new resources (e.g. from external support) cannot be enough to 
avoid cutting even unequivocably desirable private and (especially) public 
consumption and investment levels. In the context of independent Namibia that 
is a needlessly pessimistic assumption.
Over 1977-87 per capita output in Namibia fell sharply and net investment 
(excluding war related infrastructure) probably went negative overall and 
certainly for the directly productive sectors. Wasteful expenditure (at least 
from a Namibian perspective) - on parallel ’Bantustan' structures and creating 
a ’’black middle class” in the hopes it would prefer moderately comfortable 
incomes under RSA to dignity and independence with less certainty as to income 
(a hope which has failed in respect to most miners, other industrial/financial 
workers, teachers, nurses and businesspersons) and on building multiple 
structures of repression - has created a large budget deficit even though the 
tax/Gross Territorial Product ratio is very high. All of the main productive 
sectors (except perhaps diamonds) are running down in terms of underlying 
capacity to sustain or expand output even if some have recovered somewhat from 
mid-1980s current output nadirs.
The international market prospects for exports - about 90$ of goods produced - 
are mixed. For diamonds they may be promising and for karakul uncertain. 
Beef and - less clearly - fish depend on EEC market access. Base metals and - 
at least to the mid-1990s - uranium oxide have fairly unpromising prospects 
albeit for a 1989 base much less bleak than in 1985-86.
Were that the whole story, stabilisation might be fairly easy. Fiscal 
restructuring to cut waste could turn the budget around. The lowering of 
political risk should encourage reinvestment and external resource inflows. A 
coherent, credible economic strategy pursued with conviction could logically 
achieve stabilisation with growth within a year.
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But Namibia’s stabilisation challenge has another aspect - the destabilisation 
potential in the run up to and immediate transitional period after 
independence. As is only too clear from Mozambican experience, this can be 
massive even if (as in Mozambique) the independent government nationalises 
little and offers jobs on basically unchanged terms to most white 
professionals and skilled personnel. But, as illustrated by Zimbabwe, 
sometimes these dangers can in large part be averted or finessed. The dangers 
are:
1. mass exodus of the present human capital base, i.e. white professionals, 
artisans, managers and entrepreneures;
2. abandonment or deliberate rundown of much of the productive sector
capacity;
3. inability (consequential on the exodus) to maintain basic infrastructure 
and some basic services (e.g. agricultural extension) at levels adequate 
to avert deterioration of production;
44. consequential export decline and (even with an inherently conservative
fiscal stance) revenue implosion and budget deficit fuelled inflation;
5. lack of access to soft external resources leading - via export/supplier 
credit accumulation and the export/government revenue implosion - to an 
early external debt crisis even when at independence there had been no 
external debt;
6. external destabilisation operated by economic sanctions, targetted
sabotage and massive terrorism.
The possible measures relating to the last threat are different enough from 
the economic stabilisation agenda in respect to the other heads as to be 
treated in a separate section. The first five have a common set of fiscal, 
personpower, import capacity and sectoral potential answers (or partial
answers).
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Fiscal Stabilisation: Tidying and Reallocating
Namibia’s tax base is already large relative to GTP and is rather highly 
taxed. What needs to be done is largely tidying up:
1. Restoring the personal income tax to general revenue (it is now white
"second tier" revenue) but not necessarily radically revising rates and 
allowances at once;
2. cleaning up the Sales Tax (see also 4) to be a three to five rate,
progressive to R 10,000, buoyant source of revenue;
3. modernise mineral taxation to include Additional Profits Tax (on say 
Papua-New Guinea model) on high profits which would raise average rate on 
Rossing and Oranjemund;
4. create an independent customs and excise system (and, ex definitio, leave
the Southern African Customs Union): a) to allow rational import
sourcing; b) to simplify imposing selective protection; c) to allow 
setting tariff and excise rates suitable to Namibian goals (which may not 
be RSA ones); d) to integrate Excise and Sales Tax; e) probably to 
increase actual annual cash flow.
Expenditure poses rather different problems. A good deal of it (and the 
bureaucrats - black and white - running it) ought to be "redeployed" (meaning 
terminated) in the disingenuous Bank/Fundspeak terminology. Second tier 
(’homelands') authorities and other administration are areas for draconic cuts 
with actual functions (e.g. health, education) reconsolidated back to national 
ministries for non-racial use. The probable departure of white South African 
expatriate civil (?) servants (?!) will facilitate this. Probably - but not 
certainly - national defence and security (including police) expenditure will 
be less than what RSA has forced Namibia to spend on sustaining RSA's illegal 
occupation.
Clearly some services - education, water, agriculture - will require 
additional funding. Health may not, i.e. reallocation and economies of scale 
may well be adequate to move rapidly toward universal access to primary health 
care plus a rationalised hospital structure. Depending on the exact level of
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defence/security costs, the Recurrent Budget could very well be in surplus by 
18 months after independence if production (especially of minerals) and import 
capacity can be sustained.
Investment by the public sector will require external grant support and 
domestic and perhaps external borrowing (even if there is a recurrent 
surplus). Each should be estimated as to potential available, needed, prudent 
and a strategy to secure each devised. As to banking system borrowing a 
peculiarity arises. De facto Namibia will have to sell a new currency to the 
public (capital flight will carry off the bulk of the rand notes). 
Sterilizing the entire proceeds would be otiose but using them in import 
intensive ways would be problematic.
Personpower Protection and Promotion
Namibia will have the second highest number of graduates and post secondary 
certificate holders (perhaps 2,500) relative to population (of the order of 
1,750,000) at independence of the 10 SADCC states (including itself). This is 
not enough, but it is a much less threatening situation than confronted Angola 
or Mozambique or, indeed - albeit in a less fraught context - Tanzania, Zambia 
and Botswana.
Further, many black Namibians (notably ranch foremen and de facto managers) 
are already performing roles well above their nominal 'status’ and - with 
limited supplementary training and/or continued extension backup (especially 
but not only in ranching) could be promoted further.
Three key stabilisation (or decline averting) measures, therefore, are:
1. careful allocation of professional and skilled Namibians especially those 
returning from exile;
2. identifying capacities and supplementary training needs of Namibians who
however classified now - are de facto supervisory, skilled, 
para-managerial in order to train and promote them;
3. maintaining the omnipresent ranching extension services and building up
parallels in other sectors.
But the more personally acceptable white artisans, managers and professionals 
stay at least for several years the better. (Since at the latest 1980 SWAPO 
has had an articulated diplomacy aimed at achieving this - and to considerable 
result at least with the German ancestry community and probably with settlers 
born in Namibia more generally.) The price of buying time and/or citizens 
this way includes:
a. avoiding sharp cuts in nominal salaries and benefits for current 
employees;
b. allowing an extended period to decide on future citizenship (say 5 years 
after independence?);
c. making clear in practice - as well as initially stating - that private 
businesses and professionals will be encouraged within an openly set out 
set of public interest oriented legislation (i.e. analogous to Zimbabwe 
and Botswana even if not necessarily identical);
d. making (and when relevant acting promptly on) a declaration that created 
assets (i.e. not necessarily land) lawfully acquired by present owner 
will be compensated for at fair price if acquired by the state and that 
emigrants will be allowed some (not necessarily immediate total) 
allowance to export effects and remit funds (e.g. via government stock 
paying 8% interest remittable and retired/remitted in 5 to 10 annual 
tranches).
This is not a minor price especially as it limits unification of salary scales 
and tends to slow reduction of inter-racial income inequality. But replacing 
departees with new expatriates would - as a general approach - raise costs and 
reduce efficiency and not replacing them would run the risk of massive output 
losses.
Many key white personnel are with companies. Keeping or replacing them turns 
on company relations considered below in sectoral discussion.
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But new expatriates will be needed - up to 15,000 on a moderately pessimistic 
and at least 5,000 on a moderately optimistic scenario. These are not huge 
numbers, but getting the key ones fast and avoiding the crippling costs of 
direct hire at market rates will be difficult. Several complementary routes 
are worth pursuing:
1. where possible using existing Namibian ngo contacts and links - notably 
the Christian Council of Namibia and its members in relation to medical 
personnel;
2. negotiating (preferably before independence) institutional and sectoral 
key personnel standby agreements with international agencies (e.g. 
UNICEF) and countries (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Federal Germany, 
GDR, Canada, Netherlands) with which SWAPO has built up links;
3. identifying (again preferably before independence) a limited number of 
key advisors and consultants from among SWAPO*s known personal and 
institutional (e.g. the Commonwealth's CFTC, Norway's Christian Michelson 
Institute) friends and negotiating both their early arrival after the 
elections and/or independence and funding for them.
A final stabilisation priority is ability to communicate in the most literal 
sense. Independent Namibia's national language will be English. A majority 
of Namibians (including a not inconsiderable number of white settlers who may 
stay) do not speak it. Large scale functional language programmes need to be 
designed, funded, staffed and put into operation as soon as possible (e.g. 
November 15).
Sustaining Import Capacity
Because 90$ of goods used domestically are imported, Namibia's domestic 
stabilisation requires maintenance of import capacity (as well as changes in 
import composition and sourcing). That implies three priorities:
1. maintain or augment present exports (e.g. secure EEC quota access for 
beef and technical support for fisheries, pressure De Beers for a - say - 
1.5 million carat diamond quota);
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2. secure grant aid for:
a. initial external reserve creation backing new currency (as RSA will 
clearly not redeem rand in convertible currency and there will 
probably be few to redeem);
b. emergency to cope with survival and reintegration into production of 
returnees and - larger, more disadvantaged - displaced persons 
groups;
c. emergency to replace asset (e.g. vehicles, rolling stock, livestock) 
losses at independence and to build a new harbour;
d. human investment and social infrastructure capital and selected 
import intensive recurrent expenditure;
plus selective soft or semi-soft loans for:
e. directly productive sector projects (preferably jointly with joint 
venture partners);
f. directly self-financing infrastructure, e.g. power.
This has certain implications, e.g. use of the SADCC Annual Consultative
Conference umbrella, accession to Lome IV, joining World Bank (and
therefore IMF) and securing transitional IDA status (as Zimbabwe did).
3. Halting leakages:
a. create a new currency unit - say the Namib - to replace rand;
b. monitor export (especially diamond, uranium oxide, base metal) and 
import prices;
c. capital account and remittance/dividend controls at least on a 
standby basis;
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d. either import licensing or highly differentiated sales taxes to deter 
luxury consumer goods imports (or import substitution for them);
c. perhaps a devaluation albeit the undervaluation of the rand raises 
doubts as to the immediate need for such a step unless designed to 
facilitate eroding by inflation of wage/salary differentials (as in 
Zimbabwe).
Sectoral "Keep It Going” Priorities
The first is transport. The clear gap is almost certain to be lorries and 
buses which have rolled off to RSA and not returned. The second is likely to 
be railway rolling stock since while the absolute numbers of units allocated 
to "SWA" on SATS - 'SWATS' division may be adequate (e.g. 50 locomotives) 
their age and condition is something else. Further who is to run the 
lorries/buses and to operate the railways needs early attention as both the 
road transport operators and the basically Afrikaaner railway skilled labour - 
foremen - managers are 90$ likely leaver categories.
However, the greatest problem is port access. The legal case for RSA leaving 
Walvis Bay is one thing; the likelihood of its doing so quite another. No 
independent or even dependence diversifying political economic strategy can be 
run via an RSA occupied Walvis Bay. Therefore, access to a different port is 
needed fast.
Distance precludes more than emergency use of Dar es Salaam, Beira or Maputo 
and distance plus time to fill transport link gaps rules out Mocamedes and 
Puerto Alexandre. Luderitz is a useful secondary port but channel and basin 
deepening and widening would run into hard rock (literally) and the spur rail 
line's capacity without total reconstruction is unlikely to exceed 100,000 
tonnes versus 750,000-1,000,000 odd (including petroleum) needed.
The only apparent answer is Swakopmund until a harbour can be developed at the 
mouth of the Swakop (confusingly not at Swakopmund). Swakopmund is on the 
main rail line, sheltered in most weather, with an easier access channel than 
Walvis Bay, dredgeable for up to 10-15,000 tonne vessels. Floating cranes, 
lighters, a laid up tanker grounded as a tank farm with a single point buoy,
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perhaps rebuilding the jetty which could once take a North Atlantic liner on 
each side - these measures could provide a reasonably satisfactory port in 
12-18 months for perhaps $25-50 million.
The need for a pre-feasibility/pre-design/pre-engineering study is urgent 
since to use the least impracticable alternatives, i.e. Beira, Maputo, will 
both be costly and require massive lorry investment and logistical planning to 
get goods from Livingstone or Francistown to Namibia so that a firm decision 
is needed well before independence, i.e. during the constitution writing 
period when the nature of the new government will be known as the constituent 
assembly will presumably convert into the independence parliament.
Power and water pose fewer problems during stabilisation (albeit water is a 
constraint for the medium term requiring rapid forward planning if timeous 
implementation is to be possible). Stand-by technical assistance for key 
personnel (including the Windhoek recycling plant whose mal-operation would be 
likely to lead to dysentery, cholera and/or other epidemics) plus rapid 
reconstruction of the Ruacana Falls Dam-Windhoek power line and of water 
control facilities on the Angolan side of the Kunene are the immediate needs.
Ranching (cattle and sheep) needs:
a. an EEC beef access quota of at least 25,000 tonnes by 199^ and 15-20,000 
tonnes immediately;
b. keeping the extension and advisory services (largely German settler 
manned at professional levels) going and also keeping - say - 2,000 to 
2,500 ranchers on at least part of their present holdings;
c. replacing departing cattle transport (lorries), input suppliers and 
livestock (which may well be taken to RSA);
d. ensuring a viable marketing structure for karakul - possibly with a new 
broker between the Karakul Federation (Swakara) and the European 
auctions.
If 2,000-2,500 ranchers stay (out of *1,000 odd probably in Namibia in 1987/88) 
the herd problem could be acute but not dire. If almost all leave, then
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restocking over 2 to 3 years will be a necessary preliminary to renewed 
substantial exports.
Fishing cannot be stabilised for several years in the output sense. However, 
very low catch levels over two to four years may do a more basic stabilisation 
job by allowing regeneration of the stocks depleted by slaughter fishing. A 
core rock lobster and white fish industry based on Luderitz (and a domestic 
Namibian operator) can be kept going. But even in the event of RSA's leaving 
Walvis Bay at once, most vessels (and their largely white and Cape Coloured 
owners/crews) will probably have sailed to Table Bay and the South African 
tinning/mealing plant operators stripped and abandoned their factories.
Mine output stabilisation requires competent operators able to sell the 
output. There are three core mines/groups: Consolidated Diamonds Mines (De 
Beers); Rossing uranium (RTZ albeit Namibia will inherit 51% of the equity 
vote from ’SWA'); the Tsumeb group plus the new gold mine (Consolidated
Goldfields). A few other middle size mines exist but could be agency managed
by the "big three” if necessary.
De Beers has virtually offered a Botswana type deal which means - taken 
literally - higher taxes, a free 50/6 government equity share, Namibianisation, 
influence over production levels and forward planning, independent valuation 
of output before sale via De Beers Central Selling Organisation. SWAPO has 
independently implied such an approach is not unnegotiable.
Tsumeb poses more problems. The gold mine and the key Otjtihase base metal 
mine are post-mandate revocation and thus unlawful (unlike CDM and Tsumeb 
proper). Congold is a much less flexible (long term profit protection
oriented ?) partner than Anglo-De Beers. Unless a Minarco takeover of Congold
(UK) and a splitup selling the RSA interests without the Namibian happens very 
difficult negotiations (or an urgent need to acquire a new operator) are 
likely.
Rossing is even more problematic. Rossing is post-mandate revocation; RTZ is 
a very difficult group for governments or workers seeking mutually beneficial 
and equitable contractual arrangements. The uranium oxide market is complex, 
unstable and depressed. On the face of it a new North European operator and a 
drive for new term contracts (e.g. with Federal German and Asian atomic power
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companies ) would appear the least bad way forward.
Finance cannot be stabilised without structural change. A central bank is 
needed. So is a restructuring of the existing (public sector) housing and 
development banks - in the latter case dividing the lending and operating 
group management functions. The development banking sector might initially be 
joint venture with - e.g. - Commonwealth Development Corporation and Namibian 
commercial bank participation. In the commercial banking sector if the 
Namibian units of what were Barclays and Standard Banks RSA subsidiaries were 
to be transferred back to Barclays and Standard London these (perhaps as joint 
ventures) are the logical initial Namibian commercial banking core. Either 
they or a Zimbabwe merchant bank should be encouraged to set up a (possibly 
joint venture) Namibian merchant bank. A Namibian Insurance Corporation (not 
ncessarily initially on a monopoly basis - indeed preferably not until it had 
gained experience) is needed. Investment in it by other financial 
institutions and a technical/managerial partner (an established African 
National Insurance Corporation? Their Indian counterpart? A European 
reinsurance company? An international broker?) would appear desirable. The 
Central Bank should be used as a focal point and leader in designing and 
developing the sector as well as in regulating it and might be a suitable 
shareholder in some or all of the joint ventures.
Health and education need immediate restructuring and expansion of access but 
a desirable starting point is keeping the not inconsiderable present physical 
and personnel resources functioning. In the case of health this will require 
replacement managerial and doctor level personnel and a closer collaborative 
relation between the government and Christian medical services (whoever 
formally owns the facilities and however financing is handled) and in 
education rapid retraining/upgrading of the large but, in a majority of cases, 
very ill-trained black teaching cadre.
Government proper has been discussed under personpower and fiscal heads. As 
efficiency of operation, cost saving, dismantling of apartheid and the 
expatriate South African personnel most likely to leave overlap, this may be 
more a reconstruction than a cutting challenge. The exceptions are the 
political and security cadres of the ’homelands’ and some elements of the SWA 
armed forces and police. If simply fired they will be a ready-made source of 
recruits for a Namibian variant of Mozambique's RSA run and hired armed
-15-
bandits. But there do not appear to by any efficient (producing something 
useful) and fiscally acceptable alternatives.
III.
Recovery: Restoring/Augmenting Output, Employment, Revenue and Import Capacity
The Namibian economy has recovery and growth potential within its present 
technical and (abstracting from apartheid elements) structural patterns. This 
can be seen by a comparison to what has been attainable in Botswana. There 
are at least four good reasons to seek to capture at least some elements of 
this upside potential within existing structures:
1. increasing employment (and self-employment) with a positive poverty 
reduction impact;
2. augmenting government revenue needed to broaden basic service access and 
to begin major structural transformation;
3- supporting import capacity to ensure present availability of basic 
consumer goods and production inputs as well as part of the massive 
capital goods requirements for structural change;
4. creating a climate of success and confidence (domestically and 
externally) from which to mount medium and long term action.
In practice the measures sketched under stabilisation would - if and as 
successful - probably lead to 4 to 5% annual output growth at GDP level from 
the end of the second or third year of independence. (That assumes for the 
moment the absence of effective RSA destabilisation.) What are sketched below 
are certain additional measures.
Cattle - restocking, building up new markets beyond EEC, selective cutting and 
marketing to maximise value, recreation of the dairy industry, creation of 
co-operative or autogestion ranching capacity are practicable 2 to 5 year 
targets which could raise effective earnings at national level 50$ and at 
worker level at least 100$.
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Karakul - finding a partner for market promotion (using the fact that karakul 
are not an endangered wild species) and also developing wool and lamb/mutton 
markets as complements to karakul pelt sales do appear feasible.
Crops - raising grower prices (depressed by RSA dumping), identifying and 
applying relevant regional research findings (e.g. via SACCAR, the SADCC 
sorghum/millet programme and other SADCC agricultural sector activities), 
building up small farmer access to extension - inputs - transport - markets (a 
la Zimbabwe), spot irrigation (e.g. around boreholes on ranches) are possible 
2 to 5 year steps which in the North and perhaps the Otavi and Tsumeb areas - 
could lead to substantial output and (more crucially) low income household 
income gains as well as reducing the 150,000-200,000 tonne annual food import 
requirement (slighly over half grain). Oilseeds, cotton, maize (where 
ecologically suitable), tomatoes (for fish tinning) and tobacco may deserve 
special attention because of their light industry actual or potential 
linkages. But the ecology is unfriendly enough and the initial data base 
sparse enough that while potentially very valuable on the rural income and 
self-employment front such ad hoc marginal structure modifying initiatives can 
neither raise overall GDP by more than 5/6 odd nor come anywhere near full food 
self-sufficiency (which may not, in fact, be a sound objective for Namibia 
especially once economic transport links to Zimbabwe exist).
Fishing can gradually be rebuilt to perhaps 500,000 tonnes a year from 1995. 
That requires new vessels, newly trained crews, largely new processing plants 
and refrigerated stores (with much more freezing, chilling and tinning and 
less fishmeal in their output mix) and adequate (joint venture ?) external 
marketing arrangements as well as effective deep sea economic zone stock 
control, licensing and royalty collection. As with meat, domestic market 
buoyancy can be expected if there is a broadly based increase in real incomes. 
But if there is a healthy wholesale and retail sector (private, co-op or joint 
venture) with access to refrigerated lorries, small cold rooms and cold chests 
no major public policy initiatives on the distribution side appear necessary 
or even very prudent.
Mining is diverse in problems and potential. In diamonds a clear assessment 
of reserves (probably much higher than believed with the potential in the 
Northern zone just south of Luderitz and the Orange Bank upstream from present
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workings where a new operation is being begun particularly under-recognised) 
is needed. From that a rational (for Namibia and the local producer as well 
as De Beers globally) production plan and output target (say 1,500,000 carats 
plus or minus 250,000) can be negotiated. As present output is ca 1,100,00 to 
1,150,000 this would substantially increase production, exports and state 
revenue.
Uranium oxide world market prospects need assessment first to determine 
marketing strategy for Rossing and second to assess when (probably not before 
late 1990s start-up and mid-1990s initial investment) a second mine should be 
developed.
Base metals pose a greater challenge. New mines must be developed beginning 
at the latest in 1991-2 to avert a significant and accelerating fall as 
present units run out of reserves. Probably - not quite certainly - the 
deposits have been prospected and proved, but the dubious status and uncertain 
future of Namibia plus the 1975-85 base metal depression have precluded 
development. Probably whoever is manager-joint venture partner at Tsumeb 
should play a leading role as most new mines will feed the Tsumeb processing 
complex and offset the decline in output from its older mines.
Gold may be a growth area - the first step is to secure and assess prospecting 
and proving data and the second to look for partners. The preferred partners 
presumably would be Canadian or Australian to diversify away from the RSA 
connection.
For different reasons, coal and gas are probably structural change not 
recovery heads. The main coal deposit is well suited to use a spur line from 
the Trans Kalahari, but world coal market prospects make 2000 a plausible date 
for that line’s opening. A 100,000 tonne mineral processing industry oriented 
coal mine using heavy lorries (requiring 200 km of new highway) would probably 
be non-viable. The offshore Kudu Gas Field is probably commercially viable 
but only in a $400-500 million collection and chemical production (e.g. 
ammonia/urea) complex with at least a six year lead time. Namibia can expand 
Ruacana and related capacity to meet power needs past 2000 so neither coal nor 
gas would seem to be better held in reserve than used for electricity 
generation.
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Light manufacturing including agro industry (oddly created with no agro base!) 
and light engineering can be revived and extended to cement, certain building
materials and probably textiles moderately rapidly if import capacity
(operating inputs/spares), skilled personnel, consumer incomes, a healthy 
construction sector and management exist. Either private or joint venture
management would seem appropriate in the medium term given the severe 
constraints on public sector professional and managerial personnel and 
institutional capacity and the very large public corporation sector Namibia 
will inherit from RSA.
Employment creation can be furthered and would both reduce absolute poverty 
and encourage secondary crop and manufacturing production (as well as medium 
to small scale commerce and transport). Labour intensive approaches to
construction and seasonal supplementary rural jobs (on useful small scale 
infrastructural and production support work - as in Botswana) seem to deserve 
flagging. As noted there should be a not insignificant multiplier effect in
some parts of agriculture, manufacturing and commerce.
If the economy is proceeding relatively well and South African destabilisation 
is low tourism may fall in the recovery sector. Small scale developments at 
game parks, hot springs, scenic attractions, beaches and fishing points would 
be manageable by the domestic private sector with an external marketing 
partner. It could generate perhaps $50 million gross exports a year ($25
million net?) and 5,000 jobs - secondary but useful (i.e. 2 to 3% of exports
and perhaps of the would-be economically active population). These figures 
include expatriate resident tourism as it would otherwise go abroad. A side 
gain would be in making Namibia more attractive to expatriates which so long 
as they are needed is a marginal but not negligible consideration.
IV.
Toward Structural Transformation
There is no clear-cut time sequence among stabilisation, recovery, structural 
transformation. At least four priority stabilisation measures are pretty 
clearly structural: new port, dismantling second tier expenditure and
structures, new currency, independent customs system. The same could be
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argued for broader access health, education, water and extension service 
access. However, a number of agenda items are clearly structural and medium 
term (i.e. either not necessary and/or probably impracticable in the short 
term).
In transport these include:
1. regional links (road to Zambia, Angola and - via Botswana - Zimbabwe 
largely by upgrading; potentially the Trans-Kalahari to 
Botswana/Zimbabwe; coastal shipping to Angola and perhaps the India Ocean 
SADCC ports and Mombasa);
2. some upgrading and rationalisation of the domestic road/highway grid 
(albeit, even if for different reasons, the settlers and RSA have created 
80 to 90% of an adequate network);
3. evaluating the future of rail which probably should be limited to the 
Coast-Windhoek, Windhoek-Tsumeb and perhaps Windhoek-Karasburg lines 
(plus if built the TK and a spur to the Aranos coal deposits);
4. building a deepwater port with bulk handling and container facilities at 
the mouth of the Swakop (as identified in the last TK engineering study) 
to replace Walvis Bay which is a much poorer location and upgradeable - 
if at all - only at constantly rising costs and evaluating the potential 
of Luderitz as the main fishing/fish processing/fishing fleet 
construction and repair base. (The problem is that Luderitz is possibly 
too far South relative to much of the fishing area; otherwise port 
management and regional development considerations would clearly point to 
such a strategy as channel and basin limitations would not constrain 
fishing vessels nor containers loaded on coastal barges for 
trans-shipment.)
Industry can be built on fishing, agriculture (crops and ranching), basic 
consumer goods, simple and bulky construction inputs, light engineering 
(including spares and heavy maintenance) and smelting/refining to perhaps 
15—20% of GDP (10% now - half smelting/refining) by identifying and pursuing 
the viable possibilities in each. There may be need for specialised 
infrastructure and some protection (albeit half - meat, fish, metal, leather
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and leather goods would be for export and should be able to be fully
competitive). In practice for ten years that agenda is likely to be as much 
as personpower and management constraints will allow. Longer term strategic
planning could seek breakthroughs but as Namibia's raw material base is highly
specialised, its labour unlikely (barring economic disaster) to be
particularly cheap in cost per unit produced and its home market narrow where 
the breakthroughs might lie is not self-evident.
Chemicals from natural gas, chemicals from coal (if that industry makes a 
comeback as it may because of its inherently better feedstock base compared to
petrochemicals) and perhaps leather products (beyond leather and shoe parts)
are possibilities. So - probably in a SADCC regional context - could be
selected light engineering products (whether for consumer or producer use) 
directed to regional as well as domestic markets.
Agriculture can never be the driving force of the Namibian economy. The water 
to make it so does not exist and/or is too far away. But small and medium 
scale irrigation from the Kunenene, the Okavango and the Orange as well as
from seasonal or dead-end internal rivers (e.g. as now at the Hardap Dam
scheme under Mariental and potentially on the less canyoned stretches of the 
Fish River) deserve serious exploration and assessment as does spot irrigation 
from ponds (e.g. near Tsumeb), boreholes (on ranches) and dugouts (seasonal 
water collection dams back-filled with sand to limit evaporation). Care must 
be taken as Namibia's soils are fragile, water flows and stocks are not
clearly differentiated nor safe offtake levels known and careless land
handling could crack hardpan protection from underground salt lakes creating 
new Etosha Pans (notably in the Oshana country which is the heart of present 
crop production).
Similarly improved seed, animal powered, low tillage (to limit evaporation), 
low input, drought resistant cultivation research and extension should be able 
to raise present yields per hectare several fold (how many depends on just how 
low they are - the present data are both sketchy and open to multiple 
interpretations).
One prerequisite for such a transformation is a small farmer oriented
extension and support service comparable to that now serving large ranches. 
Another is a transport and commercial (inputs to sell goods to buy) network
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which may need in part to be public because less densely populated or more 
inaccessible areas may not be privately attractive even if national economic 
and social benefit/cost ratios are satisfactory.
The key priority - beyond large scale ranching - is generation of decently 
remunerative, moderately productive family employment opportunities in farming 
(probably largely mixed cropping/ranching) and supporting services plus input 
production. Assuming a 40% desired economically active ratio Namibia needs 
about 700,000 decent employment/self-employment opportunities growing perhaps 
3% a year. Outside small scale agriculture and services goods for it to it - 
including ranching (with some diversification into cropping) at 75,000 - the 
realistic medium term potential does not appear to be much above the 
300,000-400,000 range even making a fairly generous guesstimate for genuinely 
productive (and absolute poverty averting) urban '’informal”. That implies a 
need for at least 300,000 economically active (say 700,000 household members) 
in small scale agriculture and supporting activities which requires a net 
small scale agricultural output of not less than $250-350 million (including 
production of food and housing for own use) versus at most $50 million now. 
That is a very challenging goal - e.g. 150,000 additional tonnes of grain 
would be worth $15-20 million while $100 of food per person (including sales 
to 1,000,000 plus non-farm residents at retail prices of say $200-250 per 
person) $175 million now and perhaps $235 million by 2000. Adding in possible 
non-food crops and a contribution to livestock exports at say $15 and $35 
million plus $50 million in net value added of supporting services/inputs does 
reach $335 million by 2000 but all of these estimates are at the outer limits 
of realistic optimism and will require systematic data collection, research 
and experimentation beginning at the latest in 1992 for there to be any chance
of meeting even the $250 million lower "need” level by 2000.
Water evidently interlocks with agriculture. There are very real total supply
constraints and even tighter cost ones. Luckily on major rivers power and
water may often be joint products at least up to a point, but this does not 
bypass either the cost of moving water from border rivers to central plateau 
towns and mines nor the real technical and financing problems of keeping 
supply expansion apace with that of demand. (It is already lagging for 
Windhoek and Rossing - Arandis - Swakopmund - Walvis Bay are overdrawing on 
present sources thus lowering the water table in an unsustainable and highly 
undesirable manner.) Broadening access to safe drinking water (for people and
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animals - the two cannot be separated in rural Namibia) is probably easier if 
given personnel and policy priority. Short distance pipelines from small dams 
to complement borehole safe drawing potential should be able to meet this 
demand in almost all habitable areas. Botswana by and large demonstrates this 
point albeit Namibia can profit from its false starts as well as its 
relatively successful overall record.
External trade needs to become more diversified as to sources, markets and 
export products and less dominant in respect to total market and supply source 
shares. The latter depends on building up viable home market agriculture and 
industry which in turn is linked to market broadening by reducing absolute 
poverty (now perhaps 60-70?). An independent tariff policy with no - or 
selected regional - preferences should help diversification as should ACP 
membership. Selective two-way frame trade agreements in a regional or a 
broader perspective might help. (Angola needs meat and Namibia petroleum 
products - neither is able to afford to increase imports unilaterally without 
a realistic prospect of export gains. Neither the global meat nor petroleum 
markets are truly free access, constant price markets. Thus on second best 
principles both can gain from a deal at world prices. The same approach in -
e.g. - fish and vehicles might be viable with India or Brazil and with, e.g. 
live sheep or goats and petrochemicals with Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.)
A genuine Namibian (private, public and/or joint venture) external trade 
capacity is needed. Outside price monitoring by governments and hired agents 
has its uses, but also its limits. The metal marketing companies of Zambia 
and Zimbabwe and the Botswana Meat Commission (which Namibia, like Zimbabwe, 
might wish to contract as a selling agency for export sales to EEC markets) 
have built up expertise fairly rapidly. Namibia should emulate them but also 
see what can be done (perhaps initially by a joint venture with a trading 
company practising genuinely global sourcing?) on the import side. TNC’s 
transfer price and small domestic importers do not have adequate information 
to get the "best attainable prices" - both a Namibian orientation and 
commercial expertise plus access to data and scale are needed.
Mining in one sense cannot be structurally adjusted. It is inherently an 
export oriented sector whose primary contributions to the economy will remain 
import capacity and tax revenue plus a base market for light engineering and 
construction materials. What can be adjusted are the uses of the import
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capacity and state revenue and - up to a point - the availability of light 
engineering, heavy maintenance and construction inputs.
The forward linkages to manufacturing are limited - incremental more than 
structural because of the actual mineral product mix. Strategically as well 
as economically Namibia should eschew uranium processing beyond oxide. 
Diamond cutting at the top end of the market is skill and (working) capital 
intensive and at the bottom is cut-throat competitive in murky markets. Lead, 
zinc, tin are not major inputs into the products that use them. Whether 
copper refining and product production would be viable is very unclear; that 
it would have a high opportunity cost and crowd out other investment 
possibilities for little employment gain is very clear.
Gas and coal may be more promising. So too for petroleum if exploration 
(which should be encouraged on an explorer's risk, development buy-in, profit 
share, additional profits tax basis as pioneered by the Commonwealth's 
Technical Assistance Group) locates a viable field. But the first two are 
long term and finance intensive and the last initially either a new export or 
a base for a joint Namibia-Botswana refinery.
Fuel in Namibia is a poverty (and women's workload) alleviation and an 
ecological protection priority. In relatively densely populated rural areas 
the environmental degradation, absolute fuel shortages and labour cost are 
already marked while in Windhoek wood and charcoal costs are very high 
(probably higher than electricity or bottled gas or coal) and there is a 
spreading deforestation and debushing zone. Silviculture and woodlots can 
probably be developed to solve the rural and Northern town fuel challenge. It 
is doubtful they can meet the problems of Windhoek or the coastal towns. Here 
the capital and learning costs of substituting electricity, kerosine and/or 
coal need to be assessed and combined wood and other fuel production, supply 
and promotion strategies need to be devised and made operational (as is now 
being done in Maputo). In respect to poor households and ecology this is not 
a trivial issue. Central Namibia is seasonally cold; fuel for cooking and 
heating can absorb 25? of low level monthly wages in the cold season. Namibia 
is largely borderline savannah/sahel/desert country with a very unforgiving 
ecology which can make the damage from tree and bush denudation irreversible.
_2H_
Basic services (education, health, extension) structural adjustment needs to 
begin during (and to achieve success in) stabilisation. However, achieving 
universal access and patterns appropriate to Namibia will be a much longer 
term process. Fortunately it is also the sector in which SWAPO has the 
greatest experience (largely quite successful) and planning, experimentation, 
adaptation capacity.
Poverty reduction will turn on five factors:
a. overall growth so that the resources are available;
b. growth of employment/self-employment and low income worker productivity 
to provide basic personal/household consumption needs;
c. universal access to basic services (including extension, water and - for 
this purpose - affordable fuel) both in terms of direct human condition 
gains and potential to produce/earn more;
d. incomes (especially minimum wage) and fiscal (probably especially 
expenditure) policy;
e. effective participation of poor people in self-organisation, broader 
ngo’s (e.g. trade unions) and the macro and local political processes.
It cannot turn - except for the handicapped and isolated (young or aged 
without relatives to support them) or those being reintegrated into production 
after drought or war disasters - primarily on consumption transfer payments 
because the resources to provide these and to make possible general access to 
more productive employment and self-employment plus basic services are simply 
not available. As the Swahili proverb puts it - give a man a fish and he will 
eat for a day, give him a net and he will eat all his life. (Perhaps needing 
an addition on helping him/her to learn how to use the net!)
Women’s participation in society and in production is a major economic agenda 
item - or should be. Female headed households are usually poor; women 
disproportionately lack access to basic services and are under-represented 
among decision takers. These factors will not correct themselves nor will 
token "women’s programmes” do much to overcome them (let alone pastiche Women,
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Community Development and Sport Ministries). What is needed - and to a degree 
beyond that in almost all African polities - has begun to exist in SWAPO is 
both a significant number of middle as well as higher level women decision 
takers, managers and professionals and serious analysis of gender issues in 
formulating programmes in each sector. For example, if women do collect fuel 
and water then they need to be centrally involved in silviculture and small 
scale water supply management and maintenance; similarly if women-headed rural 
households are poorer because of lack of animal power (and labour power) and 
insecurity of land use rights there are clear implications for animal 
acquisition access (loan or grant) and land use right reform.
V.
Stabilisation Again - Combatting Destabilisation
South Africa seeks a region safe and profitable for apartheid. Its tactics 
vary - e.g. mass terrorism and transport sabotage in Angola and Mozambique; 
using the resulting transport vice to capture markets, block attempted 
economic disengagement and deter other anti-apartheid initiatives by 
Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe - but the two strategic goals 
are basic. South Africa's intentions for Namibia are no different. South 
Africa would probably prefer a Namibia which accepted a Walvis Bay/rail link 
transport vice as a binding constraint on policy and continued the artificial 
economic dependence on RSA so carefully built up by policy - not market forces 
- since 1916. With exploitation as before but freed of war and 'homeland' and 
buy a support class costs RSA would - at least economically - profit from 
Namibian independence. At least one of the Gang of Five (i.e. Contact Group) 
foresees and wishes such a result perceiving Namibia as the new Swaziland.
That scenario, however, is not what SWAPO intends or will attempt to do. If 
the agenda in the foregoing pages (or any other consistent with the December 
economic policy statement) is pursued and proves practicable, South Africa's 
transport and economic leverage will be eroded rapidly and South Africa's 
preferred option will - unless imposed by force - be unviable. Given the 
nature of the apartheid state and its perception of its interests and survival 
needs (however abhorrent or even maldefined they may be), there is little 
chance South Africa will accept such a reverse. It is likely to move toward a
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destabilisation programme similar to (though not necessarily as intensive as) 
that which it has so tenaciously, mendaciously, brutally and - up to a point - 
effectively visited on Mozambique since mid-1981.
South Africa has already - whether as a pre-independence destabilisation plan 
of its own or consequential on shorter run objectives - created the 
infrastructure for intensive, systematic, rapid economic and broader 
destabilisation of Namibia. First, it has created the purported external debt 
which would be crippling if accepted and might damage external financial
relations if repudiated. Secondly, it has created a budgetary shambles giving 
the impression to the superficial observer that Namibia is a fiscal 'basket 
case' not worth assisting. Thirdly, via the ’Representative Authorities' is 
has created an administrative monstrosity. Fourthly, is has created a 
30-40,000 household black middle class with consumption levels of 10-40 times 
the black average. In respect to its skilled and professional members this 
will create future income distribution and fiscal problems and/or bitterness 
at the loss of (not absolutely very high) incomes ’won' under colonialism.
From its ethnic political, ’homeguard’ and Koevoet type fractions plus its
Angola San mercenaries and UNITA cadres/camp followers it is enrolling as 
Namibians and will doubtless leave behind in an alien, hostile land. It can 
provide the front leadership and striking forces of an orchestrated insurgency 
campaign run from Pretoria with a stronger starting point than the MNR had and 
- if the economy goes badly and real incomes of the skilled and professional 
fractions are rapidly eroded - with a potentially broader political appeal. 
Fifthly, by reinforcing its practical position in respect to Walvis Bay it has 
ensured that it will have a choke point to ’control' Namibian policy or to
destabilise a 1’outrance until alternative port facilities are operational. 
Sixthly, the sea bastion of its new Orange River Line at Alexander’s Bay is 
within mortar or launch distance of Namibia's premier economic asset - 
Oranjemund - while the Swakop River ’boundary’ of the Walvis Bay 'enclave' is 
in similar range of the logical alternative harbour - Swakopmund.
Since the infrastructure for the contingency already exists, the first 
strategic and policy responses should be to dismantle or neutralise it. 
First, the 'debt' should be repudiated now (very little is in fact held 
outside South Africa) with the International Court opinion and both 
post-colonial and post-revolutionary precedent marshalled in a supporting 
brief. Second, the budgetary reconstruction priority (which exists in any
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case) should be underlined and, third, so should that for administrative
reform and restructuring. Fourth, the professional and skilled fractions of 
the black middle class must be socially and politically mobilised and - if at 
all possible consistent with reducing inequality and avoiding fiscal disaster 
- their individual losses of present income levels minimised. The other 
fractions pose a straight security (or demobilisation/conversion) problem and
not a political economic policy challenge. Fifth, Swakopmund must be
reactivated at the earliest possible opportunity. Luderitz used as an interim 
fishing base and road links to Angolan and (via the Zambia - Botswana -
Zimbabwe - Mozambique - Tanzania rail systems) to Indian Ocean ports given 
priority to establish a fallback position from Swakopmund. Sixth, the cost to 
South Africa of attacking Oranjemund and Swakopmund needs to be maximized. In
large part this is a diplomatic policy problem, but relevant political 
economic choices do exist - e.g. a De Beers joint venture presence at
Oranjemund, a Netherlands or Nordic interim senior port management at
Swakopmund.
Such action could reduce the effectiveness - and raise the cost - of South 
African destabilisation. It can be planned - and should be publicised - now, 
for implementation at independence. Detailed responses to particular patterns 
of destabilisation are harder to articulate now and probably not desirable to 
publicise in detail in any event. However, they have a claim to priority 
consideration.
This is not an adequate answer but it is the most Namibia or Namibian
political economic policy can supply. The real need is to end the apartheid 
state and the second best to keep an international boundary patrol/trip wire 
force (whether a reduced UNTAG or a Commonwealth force) which South Africa 
will hesitate to thrust aside because of international reactions. The states 
with the greatest leverage on the first best solution are notoriously 
unwilling to use that leverage in full; some at least (vide the amputations 
carried out on UNTAG) are unlikely to accept even the bill for the second 
(although it may be just within the realm of the politically feasible). Thus 
the need for a third best damage limitation strategy as outlined here.
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Envoi
For agendas too even the longest road must be traversed step by step. This 
paper is in fact not a first step (even for the present author). It builds on 
15 years of SWAPO, UNIN and other analysis of and statements about feasible 
initial and longer term goals and means to achieve them. Nothing comparable 
would have been possible for most African states a year before independence 
either on the data and analysis side or on having a clear enough liberation 
movement set of articulated goals to build a coherent policy agenda
potentially relevant to achieving them.
That said, any such agenda drawn up in 1960—6̂4 or 1975-80 would have been both 
more optimistic and ambitious and more radical and challenging to the world 
economy as it related to the country about to be independent. (That can be 
said of SWAPO's 1988 statement too in contrast to 1975 Mozambican ones or even 
the initial perspectives drawn by Jerry Rawlings and the late Thomas Sankara 
in the 1980s.) Why?
1. The world economic environment is hostile to small, poor, fragile
economies to a degree far greater than was true in the 1970s or apparent 
in 1980;
2. the environment confronting a neighbour of RSA is peculiarly dangerous 
and renders rapid, selective dependence and vulnerability reduction and 
building up counters to destabilisation absolute priorities;
3. radical rhetoric (albeit not all radical policy if carefully and
economically presented and defended) and open root and branch refusal to 
accept at least some main lines of the f,new conventional wisdom” do block 
access to adequate (or even moderately - as opposed to hopelessly - 
inadequate) flows of soft external resources and therefore have a high 
opportunity cost;
^. over-optimism about how much can be done how fast has high costs - not 
least psychologically, politically and socially - and is distinguishable 
from having clear and major long term goals and firm, operational 
commitments to moving toward them but also a relatively cautious and 
highly prioritised set of initial and medium term targets;
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5. the economic and strategic realities so brutally imposed on Southern 
Africa over 1980—1988 caution a deliberate "long march" not a "dash for 
death or glory" approach. The epitaph on one country's first serious 
strategic and would-be operational planning exercise as "the plan of all 
our dreams" is poignant but also elegiac and no would-be practising 
politician, decision taker or advisor consciously sets out to write his 
own elegy when trying to formulate an applied action agenda.
In any case the agenda - if achieved - is not so modest or marginal as it may 
seem. It would put Namibia on the road to being another Botswana in resource 
availability and basic services terms which (as witnessed by human condition 
as well as economic indicators) is by no means a negligible target. And as a 
set of first steps it would make most subsequent ones easier not harder. One 
lesson of Africa since 1980 is that radical political economic goals can be 
furthered (up to a point) and regression from what had once been won limited 
only when at least a certain degree of cautious, selective radical pragmatism 
is built into the operational strategy. Survival is not enough but it is 
usually a necessary precondition to doing anything more; sought (consciously 
or inadvertently) martyrdom is rarely an optimal strategy for a state or its 
leadership and a dash for instant transition to socialism with instant 
disengagement from South Africa's economy and economic actors plus maximum 
distancing from all aspects of the capitalist world economic order would for 
Namibia and for SWAPO constitute sought martyrdom. Judging by 1981—1988 SWAPO 
policy statements and interviews by leaders, radical pragmatism and step by 
step gains not a glorious martyrdom are what SWAPO wants and presumably would 
wish its external friends to advise on ways and means toward achieving.
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